Unit 7 Macroeconomic policy in the global economy

7.4 The ultimate Fix economy: A country within a common currency area

As of early 2024, roughly 12% of the world’s population live in countries that do not have their own currency. In addition to the 20 eurozone countries that share a common currency, the euro, some countries adopt another country’s currency—such as the US dollar.

common currency area, currency union, monetary union
A common currency area (sometimes called a currency union or monetary union) is group of countries that use the same currency. This means there is just one monetary policy for the group.

A common currency area is also known as a monetary union.

base money, monetary base, high-powered money
Base money (also called the monetary base and sometimes high-powered money) consists of the cash held by households, firms, and banks, together with the balances held by commercial banks in their reserve accounts at the central bank.

A country within a common currency area does not have its own monetary policy. Base money (reserves and currency) is issued by the shared central bank, which controls the policy interest rate. So in the case of the eurozone, the European Central Bank issues euros and sets the policy rate for the 20 member countries, which all use the euro.

What about the exchange rate?

The exchange rate for any given member country against countries outside the currency union is the same, and it is determined by the exchange rate of the common currency against other global currencies. Therefore, the nominal exchange rate of the euro fluctuates on a day-to-day basis relative to the dollar, the yen, the Chinese yuan, and many other currencies. For this reason, the IMF classifies the euro as a fully flexible currency, like the Japanese yen, the British pound, and the US dollar, for example.

But what about exchange rates between member countries?

Before the eurozone was created, member countries all had their own currencies. But now that member countries all use the euro, you may think that the concept of a nominal exchange rate between eurozone members is simply not relevant. From an economist’s perspective, however, there is still an exchange rate, but for all member countries, \(e = 1\), and this exchange rate simply cannot change.

So, for example, Spanish euro coins have a different design from German euro coins but Spanish euros and German euros can be used interchangeably. Since they can be exchanged one-for-one, the nominal exchange rate between Spain and Germany (and all other countries within the eurozone) is fixed at \(e = 1\).

Hence, the economy of a country that belongs to a common currency area is ultimately a Fix economy, with a fixed exchange rate, and interest rates entirely dependent on monetary policy set elsewhere (in the eurozone by the ECB).

An example: Spanish and German currencies before and after the euro

unit of account
A standard unit that is used to measure and compare the market value of different goods and services. One of the functions of money in the economy is to act as a unit of account.

Before they joined the eurozone, both Spain and Germany had their own currencies. In Spain, as discussed in Section 7.3, for example, all prices were measured in terms of the Spanish currency, the peseta. During this period, the peseta was therefore the unit of account in Spain, while the Deutsche Mark (DM) was the unit of account in Germany. Figure 7.10 shows that the nominal exchange rate between the peseta and the DM fluctuated significantly, and that for a number of years the peseta depreciated rapidly against the DM.

With the introduction of the euro in 1999, both currencies were converted into the new currency, the euro, at pre-agreed rates. For Spain, the peseta was converted at the rate Pts 166.4 = €1. For Germany, the DM was converted at the rate DM 1.96 = €1. Specifying Spain as the home country, we could therefore think of the nominal exchange rate, \(e\), between the peseta and the DM as being effectively fixed indefinitely from that point onwards at 166.4/1.96 = Pts 85 per DM.

These conversion rates actually continued for many years after the eurozone was created. Until 2021, if you found an envelope full of peseta banknotes in a drawer somewhere, you could take them into an office of the Bank of Spain, and convert them into euros at the same fixed rate. The Bundesbank went further: even today (as of 2024) if you happen to find an envelope of DM notes, you can still convert these into euros. So up until 2021, at least, this fixed peseta/DM exchange rate did effectively survive in this limited form. An envelope containing 1,000 DM had the same value as an envelope containing 85,000 pesetas. Aside from rounding errors, you would have got the same number of euros when exchanging the contents of each envelope.

But since in 1999 both countries adopted a new currency, the euro, they simultaneously both changed their unit of account to be the euro. From that point onwards, since both countries measured prices in euros, we can also view the nominal exchange rate between their notional currencies as being fixed at \(e = 1\), and this is the approach we take in what follows.

Real exchange rates within a common currency area

Being a member of the eurozone fixes nominal exchange rates permanently against other members of the eurozone. But for effects on the real economy in their country (output, employment, and so on), we need to think about the real exchange rate. The formula for the real exchange rate shows that fixing the nominal exchange rate does not fix the real exchange rate.

In what follows, we again take a Spanish perspective—Spain is the ‘home’ country, and Germany is ‘foreign’. Since the nominal exchange rate, \(e\), between Spain and Germany is 1, Spain’s real exchange rate relative to Germany simplifies to:

\[c = \frac{1 \times P^*}{P} = \frac{P^*}{P}\]

As in earlier sections, \(^*\) is always used to denote ‘foreign’ but which country is home and which is foreign can be different in different examples. Always check what \(^*\) refers to.

—that is, the price, \(P^*\), of German goods and services relative to the price, \(P\), of those produced in Spain, both measured in euros.

Then if, for example, inflation is higher in Spain than in Germany, the price of Spanish goods and services rises relative to German prices. Since Spanish goods become relatively more expensive, Spain’s competitiveness, \(P^*/P\), falls, or in other words, its real exchange rate appreciates—even though the nominal exchange rate is fixed.

Competitiveness will only remain unchanged if prices in euros in the two countries rise at the same rate. For example, if inflation in both countries is 2%, both \(P\) and \(P^*\) go up by 2% per annum and competitiveness stays constant.

Fix regime: Impact of a country-specific demand shock within a common currency area

What happens if Spain, as a member of the eurozone, is hit by a country-specific shock that raises aggregate demand—such as a housing boom?

Member countries’ central banks continue to exist in the eurozone, but they play no role in monetary policy. Their responsibility is to physically manage the euro notes and coins for their national systems of cash distribution and conduct financial market supervision.

Figure 7.5 shows that in a benchmark FlexIT economy, the home country’s central bank would raise the interest rate in response to such a shock and that appreciation of the nominal exchange rate would reinforce the impact of monetary tightening. But the Bank of Spain cannot use the interest rate as a policy tool. When Spain entered the eurozone, control over this tool was handed over to the European Central Bank. The ECB would not be doing its job properly if it responded to something that affected the Spanish economy but had no effect on inflation elsewhere in the eurozone. The exchange rate of the euro against other currencies is not fixed, but if the ECB is holding monetary policy constant, we would not expect that to change either.

However, the real exchange rate can still play a major role in stabilizing shocks that only affect one eurozone member country. As in the benchmark case of the FlexIT economy, an appreciation in the real exchange rate depresses the country’s net exports and offsets the rise in aggregate demand. In a FlexIT economy, this happens rapidly because the nominal exchange rate appreciates when the central bank raises the interest rate. But since Spain’s nominal exchange rate is fixed, its real exchange rate adjusts only slowly following the country-specific demand shock, through changes in its inflation rate (via wage and price changes). Work through Figure 7.11 to understand how this happens.

The impact of a positive aggregate demand shock for a country in a common currency area. Spain is the home economy. (Contains Questions 7.9–7.12.)
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11

Figure 7.11 The impact of a positive aggregate demand shock for a country in a common currency area. Spain is the home economy. (Contains Questions 7.9–7.12.)

A positive demand shock:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11a

A positive demand shock

On entering the eurozone, Spain’s initial AD curve is \(AD_0\), implying equilibrium output \(Y_0\).
To simplify, we assume that initially Spain is also at supply-side equilibrium, with actual inflation of 2%, equal to expected inflation. German inflation is also constant, at 2%.
A positive domestic demand curve shock such as a boom in investment in new housing shifts the curve to \(AD_1\).
As long as there is spare capacity in the economy, output increases from \(Y_0\) to \(Y_1\).

The immediate effects of the demand shock:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11b

The immediate effects of the demand shock

The rise in output causes employment to rise, which causes a rightward movement along the Phillips curve.
As a result, inflation increases to 4%.

Question 7.9 Choose the correct answer(s)

What impact will this have on the real exchange rate, \(c = e P^*/P\)? Read the following statements and choose the correct option(s).

  • It will have no impact.
  • Since German inflation is unchanged, the real exchange rate \(c = e P^*/P\) will depreciate.
  • Since German inflation is unchanged, the real exchange rate \(c = e P^*/P\) will appreciate.
  • It depends on how German inflation changes.
  • There will be an impact because \(P\) has changed, while (in the time frame considered) all other variables are unchanged.
  • German inflation (\(P*\)) is unchanged, so an increase in \(P\) causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.
  • German inflation (\(P*\)) is unchanged, so an increase in \(P\) causes the real exchange rate to appreciate.
  • German inflation (the rate of change of \(P*\)) is unchanged in the immediate time frame considered.
A rise in inflation affects the real exchange rate:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11c

A rise in inflation affects the real exchange rate

The rise in output causes employment to rise, which causes a rightward movement along the Phillips curve. As a result, inflation increases to 4%.
With stable inflation in Germany, the increase in Spanish inflation causes a rise in \(P/P^*\), thereby causing the real exchange rate, \(c = eP^*/P\), to fall and worsen competitiveness.

Question 7.10 Choose the correct answer(s)

How else could we describe this effect on the exchange rate? Choose the correct option(s).

  • There is a real depreciation.
  • There is a real appreciation.
  • The real exchange rate is unchanged, since there is no longer a Spanish currency.
  • There is a fall in the real price of Spanish goods to German consumers.
  • In terms of this definition, a fall in the real exchange rate is a real appreciation.
  • In terms of this definition, a fall in the real exchange rate is a real appreciation.
  • In terms of this definition, a fall in the real exchange rate is a real appreciation.
  • Worse competitiveness means the opposite: the real price of German goods to Spanish consumers falls, thereby worsening competitiveness of Spanish goods.
The real exchange rate appreciates:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11d

The real exchange rate appreciates

The rise in output causes employment to rise, which causes a shift to the right along the Phillips curve.
As a result, inflation increases to 4%.
With stable inflation in Germany, the increase in Spanish inflation causes a rise in \(P/P^*\), thereby causing the real exchange rate, \(c = e P^*/P\), to fall (a real appreciation).

Question 7.11 Choose the correct answer(s)

What impact will this have on the economy? Read the following statements and choose the correct option(s).

  • There will be no impact, because AD is only affected by domestic demand.
  • \(c\) has fallen, so Spanish goods are now cheaper in real terms, causing the AD curve to shift further upwards.
  • The real appreciation will make Spanish goods and services less competitive. The AD curve will revert to its original position.
  • The real appreciation will make Spanish goods and services less competitive. The AD curve will shift downwards, but not necessarily as far as its original position.
  • AD is affected by foreign demand as well. (Exports are part of the aggregate demand equation.)
  • Competitiveness has fallen, so Spanish goods are more expensive in real terms, causing the AD curve to shift downwards to its original position.
  • Spanish goods are more expensive in real terms, causing the AD curve to shift downwards to its original position.
  • The AD curve will shift downwards to its original position because the boost to demand from higher investment will ultimately be exactly offset by the loss of competitiveness.
The subsequent effects of a real appreciation:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11e

The subsequent effects of a real appreciation

The real appreciation, implying worsening competitiveness, causes a fall in exports and a rise in imports. As a result, over time as competitiveness worsens further, the AD curve will shift downwards.
As long as the economy stays away from supply-side equilibrium, and inflation stays above the German inflation rate, competitiveness will worsen and the AD curve will progressively shift backwards. In due course, the boost to demand from higher investment will ultimately be offset by the loss of competitiveness, and so the AD curve will shift back to \(AD_0\).

Question 7.12 Choose the correct answer(s)

What will happen at this point? Read the following statements and choose the correct option(s).

  • If inflation expectations have not adjusted upwards, inflation will fall back to 2%, and the real exchange rate will adjust back to its initial value.
  • If inflation expectations adjust upwards, inflation will remain above German inflation, and so the exchange rate will continue to appreciate.
  • If inflation expectations have not adjusted upwards, inflation will fall back to 2%, and the real exchange rate will stop appreciating, but \(c\) will remain above its initial level.
  • If inflation expectations have not adjusted upwards, inflation will fall back to 2%, and the real exchange rate will stop appreciating, but \(c\) will remain below its initial level.
  • Output will gradually fall back to its initial level, due to worsening net trade. This brings inflation back down as well, so that the real exchange rate levels off, but at a lower level than initially.
  • Competitiveness worsens, causing output to gradually fall back to its initial level, due to worsening net trade. This brings inflation back down as well, so that the real exchange rate levels off instead of appreciating.
  • The initial rise in output increases inflation; but, as inflation persists, the real exchange rate appreciates. Competitiveness worsens, causing output to gradually fall back to its initial level, due to worsening net trade. The real exchange rate levels off, but at a lower level than initially.
  • The initial rise in output increases inflation; but, as inflation persists, the real exchange rate appreciates. Competitiveness worsens, causing output to gradually fall back to its initial level, due to worsening net trade. This brings inflation back down as well, so that the real exchange rate levels off, but at a lower level than initially.
Output, inflation, and the real exchange rate over time:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11f

Output, inflation, and the real exchange rate over time

Viewed over time, the initial rise in output increases inflation; but, as inflation persists, the real exchange rate appreciates.
Competitiveness worsens, causing output to gradually fall back to its initial level, due to worsening net trade.
This brings inflation back down as well, so that the real exchange rate levels off, but at a lower level—implying worse competitiveness.
There is higher domestic aggregate demand and lower net exports.

Net exports and competitiveness:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-11g

Net exports and competitiveness

If the initial impetus for the demand shock disappears (red dashed lines), this will depress output below its initial level. Remember that net exports are lower because Spain has become less competitive.
With output and employment below equilibrium, inflation will fall below 2% and eventually competitiveness will be restored.
But this requires Spanish inflation to be below German inflation for a prolonged period.

To summarize: Figure 7.11 tells us that when the demand shock stimulates domestic inflation in only one member country, there is no response to reverse this through a rise in the policy interest rate because monetary policy is turned off. Over the course of time, through successive rounds of wage and price setting, sustained higher domestic inflation will mean that home’s real exchange rate will appreciate, and therefore progressively worsen its net exports, \(X – M\). This will eventually offset the impact of the positive demand shock.

Hence, there are significant contrasts, but also important similarities, with the FlexIT economy.

  • FlexIT economy: The reversal of aggregate demand can be quite rapid. The central bank’s increase in the policy interest rate immediately causes an appreciation of home’s nominal exchange rate. Foreign exchange markets respond quickly to changes in the interest rate. Prices respond more slowly, so for given values of \(P\) and \(P^*\), this would also imply a real appreciation, offsetting the impact of the demand shock.
  • Common currency area (extreme case of a ‘Fix’ regime): Since home’s nominal exchange rate cannot change, the aggregate demand shock is only slowly offset as higher domestic inflation produces a gradual real appreciation. If, for example, we assume (as in Unit 4) that wages are set annually and prices update after the wage round, the process of real appreciation will be protracted.

If the demand shock is permanent, then Spain’s competitiveness will permanently worsen, and net exports will be permanently lower when equilibrium is restored. If the demand shock is temporary, then reversing the effects of the real appreciation on its net exports would require a real depreciation, which in turn requires Spanish inflation to be below German inflation for a protracted period. In the absence of other changes, this is likely to lead to a prolonged period of unemployment.

What determines long-run inflation in a common currency area?

We know from Unit 5 that in an economy with a stable inflation target (FlexIT), in the long run inflation will always converge back to the central bank’s target rate of inflation, with unemployment at the supply-side equilibrium.

What determines the long-run inflation rate of a country in the eurozone? The answer is that each member country’s inflation rate is ultimately determined by the inflation target of the European Central Bank.

To understand why, we again need to think about the real exchange rate.

We argued earlier that an economy can only be in supply-side equilibrium if its real exchange rate, or competitiveness, is constant. This condition applies equally to an economy, like Spain, within a common currency area.

In the previous section, we saw that constant competitiveness requires that the following condition must hold:

\[\text{Constant competitiveness} \Rightarrow \delta = \pi - \pi^*\]

In the context of a FlexNIT economy, we argued that—for a home economy with a higher inflation rate than the foreign economy (\(π > π^*\))—this must imply that the nominal exchange rate depreciates at a rate, \(\delta\), that offsets the impact on competitiveness.

Clearly the same condition also applies in any Fix economy where the nominal exchange rate is completely fixed—an issue we shall come back to.

In the context of a member of a common currency area, our ultimate Fix economy, we use the same expression but now the causation runs in the opposite direction. Fixing the nominal exchange rate irrevocably means that, by definition, \(\delta\) must be zero. Therefore:

\[\text{Constant competitiveness in a common currency area} \Rightarrow \pi = \pi^*\]

which, if Spain is the home economy, means that Spanish prices must be growing at the same rate as prices in the eurozone as a whole. Here, \(^*\) indicates the eurozone.

In other words, to reach long-run equilibrium, Spanish inflation, \(π\), must converge to average inflation in the eurozone, \(π^*\). We have already argued that the eurozone itself, taken as a whole, can be viewed as a FlexIT economy, with monetary policy set by the ECB, and an exchange rate for the euro that is fully flexible and which fluctuates against other major currencies. We show in Unit 5 that in any FlexIT economy, the ultimate determinant of the inflation rate is the target rate of the central bank. So if the ECB is doing its inflation-targeting job, \(π^*\) will converge to its target inflation rate, \(π^T_\text{ECB}\).

Therefore, the long-run rate of inflation for any individual country that is a member of the eurozone (like Spain) is:

\[\pi = \pi^* = \pi^T_\text{ECB}\]

While this condition will hold on average over the long term, it will not hold at every point in time. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 7.11, for as long as the home economy (like Spain) is away from its supply-side equilibrium, its inflation rate will be different from the ECB’s target rate, and its real exchange rate will not be constant.

So why join a common currency area?

By now you may be wondering: why would a country like Spain join the eurozone, and thereby adopt the most extreme case of the Fix regime? The arguments so far seem to suggest that it compares unfavourably with the FlexIT regime. While movements in the real exchange rate do have a stabilizing effect on a Fix economy, these operate more slowly than in a FlexIT regime. And while inflation is stabilized, at least over the long term, at the target rate set by the ECB, the Spanish government does not get to choose this rate. Its monetary policy is entirely dependent.

Why not have a FlexIT regime instead? One reason is that the successful operation of monetary policy in a FlexIT regime relies on the credibility of the government’s commitment to the independence of the central bank. Unless the government can make a credible commitment to delegate monetary policy fully and permanently, and set a stable inflation target, a common currency zone will tie its hands more securely.

Another argument for joining a common currency area relates more to microeconomics than macroeconomics. Within any given country, we take it for granted that all regions use the same currency. Different currencies would be inconvenient (and costly) for interregional trade of goods and services. The same logic applies to a group of countries that have a lot of cross-border trade, and is a key motivation for the formation of a common currency area.

In comparison with a FlexNIT regime, the balance of arguments is much more favourable. Without the discipline of an independent central bank with a stable inflation target, inflation in a FlexNIT economy can easily drift upwards. Inflation can also drift up for a eurozone member, but only temporarily, given that it brings with it a real appreciation. In the long run, inflation for a eurozone member country will be pinned down by the ECB’s target rate, so membership of the eurozone rules out any sustained upward drift in the inflation rate.

An example: Real exchange rate changes and the impact on the Spanish economy after joining the eurozone in 1999

The processes we have described in this section are not just theoretical. The evidence shows that something very similar did happen to Spain in the years after it joined the eurozone. Figure 7.12 tells the story with reference to data on Spain and Germany.

Spain vs Germany post-1999: impact of eurozone membership on the Spanish economy. Throughout this example, Spain is ‘home’ and Germany is ‘foreign’.
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12

Figure 7.12 Spain vs Germany post-1999: impact of eurozone membership on the Spanish economy. Throughout this example, Spain is ‘home’ and Germany is ‘foreign’.

Spain’s inflation in 1999:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12a

Spain’s inflation in 1999

As shown in Figure 7.10, in the period before adopting the euro, Spain had for a long time had much higher inflation than Germany. In the years just before entry, however, inflation had fallen back, to close to the German rate.

1999–2009: Spain becomes less competitive than Germany:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12b

1999–2009: Spain becomes less competitive than Germany

A positive demand shock in Spain:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12c

A positive demand shock in Spain

The positive demand shock in Spain keeps Spanish inflation higher than German inflation:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12d

The positive demand shock in Spain keeps Spanish inflation higher than German inflation

The effect of the positive demand shock on competitiveness:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12e

The effect of the positive demand shock on competitiveness

The real exchange rate and GDP per capita:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12f

The real exchange rate and GDP per capita

The effects of continued real exchange rate appreciation:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12g

The effects of continued real exchange rate appreciation

Spain enters a recession:
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12h

Spain enters a recession

As the housing boom collapsed, Spain went into a steep recession, with large increases in unemployment.

Inflation in Spain vs Germany (2005–2022):
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https://www.core-econ.org/macroeconomics/07-macroeconomic-policy-global-economy-04-common-currency-area.html#figure-7-12i

Inflation in Spain vs Germany (2005–2022)

Question 7.13 Choose the correct answer(s)

Read the following statements regarding Figure 7.12 and choose the correct option(s).

  • Spain and Germany are both members of the eurozone. In the data, their average inflation rate has been very similar since 2005. That is what we would expect for countries in a common currency area.
  • Spain having a higher inflation rate than Germany in the early 2000s meant that Spain’s real exchange rate against Germany depreciated during that period.
  • The impact of the collapse of the housing boom in Spain was dramatic and led to a fall in GDP in Spain relative to Germany.
  • When Spain and Germany entered the eurozone in 1999, Spain had a higher inflation rate than Germany. By 2022, Spain’s real exchange rate had appreciated by over 10% relative to its value on entering the eurozone.
  • In a common currency area, in the long run the inflation rate of member countries will converge back to the target inflation rate of the block’s central bank.
  • The real exchange rate was falling, which means that the value of \(c\) was declining. That represents a real appreciation—not depreciation—and a decline in competitiveness. (Review Section 5.14 if you are confused about this concept.)
  • Spain experienced a deep recession and high unemployment following the collapse of the housing market (and the financial crisis) in 2007–2009.
  • \(c = e P^*/P\). \(P\) was rising more quickly overall than \(P^*\), so the value of \(c\) fell overall, representing a real appreciation.

Exercise 7.2 Calculating real exchange rates

The real exchange rate is calculated as the nominal exchange rate divided by the price ratio (home prices relative to those elsewhere).

  1. For the country you live in and another country of your choice, find data on the nominal exchange rate and CPI, covering at least the last 10 years. (You can find inflation data for most countries from the World Bank’s inflation database.) Use this data to calculate the real exchange rate between your chosen countries.
  2. Plot an appropriate chart to show how the real exchange rate changed over time, and describe some patterns you observe. What macroeconomic policies or events could contribute to these patterns?