Unit 10 Women’s right to vote and the reduction in child mortality in the United States

10.6 Democracy makes a difference

The median voter model in Section 10.4 helps us to understand the impact of one of the major developments in twentieth-century economics and politics: the extension of voting rights to virtually all adults. In consequence, governments have increasingly devoted tax revenues to public services and other expenditures that differentially helped the poor. The result has been that people have acquired more of their well-being by right, as a citizen, rather than purchasing it as a marketed good or service.

The twentieth century—the century of the advance of democracy (Figure 10.6)—was also one that saw a reduction in wealth inequality, as is evident from Figure 10.5, at least up until the last quarter of the century. The growth of various forms of social insurance is a big part of the two steps up in the size of the government shown for the UK in Figure 10.2, the first taking place after the extension of suffrage in 1928, and the second in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Friedrich Hayek warned in his book Road to Serfdom that the growing size of government would undermine democracy and the rule of law, pointing to the experience of Germany under fascism and the Soviet Union under communism.1

This does not appear to be the case in general: Figure 10.8 shows that some countries ranked highly on measures of democracy —Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Belgium—are notable for their high levels of government tax revenues as a fraction of GDP. The US and the UK, with smaller governments, are ranked lower.2 3

This scatter plot shows the relationship between the extent of electoral democracy and the size of government. The horizontal axis displays the size of government, measured as government revenue as a percentage of GDP, ranging from 0% to 60%. The vertical axis displays the extent of electoral democracy, ranging from 0 to 1. The chart shows a positive correlation, with countries that have larger governments generally scoring higher on the electoral democracy index. Countries such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium appear in the upper-right with both large governments and high democracy scores. Countries like the US, UK, and Japan also have relatively high democracy scores with medium to large governments. In contrast, countries such as Pakistan and Uganda appear lower on the democracy index with smaller government sizes.
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https://core-book-server.vercel.app/macroeconomics/10-government-as-economic-actor-06-democracy-makes-a-difference.html#figure-10-8

Figure 10.8 The extent of electoral democracy and the size of government.

Note: Correlation coefficient: 0.676. Not shown are countries with a population of less than five million people and three countries (Kuwait, Libya, Ukraine) for which the ratio of government revenue to GDP is not an informative measure of the size of the government. Country labels correspond to the red points.
Michael Coppedge et al. 2025. ‘V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v15’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. IMF. World Economic Outlook.

correlation
Two variables in a sample of data are said to be correlated if we observe that they tend to change together. If high values of one variable (e.g. people’s earnings) commonly occur along with high values of another variable (e.g. years of education) the variables are positively correlated. When high values of one variable (e.g. ice cream sales) are associated with low values of the other variable (e.g. number of people wearing winter coats) there is a negative correlation. If variables are correlated, it doesn’t mean that there is a causal relationship between them: higher ice cream sales might not have caused fewer people to wear winter coats. See also: causality.

But this correlation does not show that a larger government promotes democracy. The most that can be said is that long-standing democracy and a large government (relative to the size of the economy) can coexist.

Other than an increase in the size of government, are there other effects of the advance of democracy on the functioning of the economy? The exper­ience of many countries suggests a positive answer. For example, the ‘golden age of capitalism’ (the three decades following the Second World War) was the first period in which all of the major economies were governed by democracies.4

While it seems reasonable that democracy was partly behind these success stories, for example through greater political stability, it is impossible to establish democracy as the only or main cause. Too many other things changed at the same time that might account for the economic changes.

The countries that took the lead in advancing political equality have a different balance now between work time and free time, as Figure 10.9 shows. This is not surprising, given that the reduction in working hours over the past 100 years was not simply a matter of individuals choosing shorter workdays. As explained in Unit 3 of the microeconomics volume, it was also the result of political parties (especially after the extension of the vote to workers) seeking legislation to limit the number of hours a person could be asked to work without additional pay.

This scatter plot shows the relationship between years of uninterrupted democracy and average annual hours worked across countries. The horizontal axis displays years of democracy from 25 to 125. The vertical axis displays average annual hours worked, ranging from 1,300 to 2,200. The chart shows a negative relationship: countries with longer periods of democracy tend to have fewer working hours. Some European countries such as Denmark, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands have over 70 years of democracy and fewer than 1,400 average hours worked. In contrast, countries with shorter democratic histories, such as Mexico, South Africa, Taiwan, and Poland, have fewer than 50 years of democracy and more than 2,000 average hours worked. Countries like the United States, Japan, and Italy fall in the middle with 50–80 years of democracy and around 1,700 annual hours.
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https://core-book-server.vercel.app/macroeconomics/10-government-as-economic-actor-06-democracy-makes-a-difference.html#figure-10-9

Figure 10.9 The uninterrupted duration of democracy as of 2024 and working hours (2019).

Note: The correlation coefficient is −0.573. The years of democracy measure is from Figure 10.6, using the dark-green bars (electoral democracy without substantial limits to voting rights).
Michael Coppedge et al. 2025. ‘V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v15’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Robert C. Feenstra, Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. ‘The Next Generation of the Penn World Table’. American Economic Review 105(10): pp. 3150–3182.

Figure 10.10 shows that many of the countries that were the first to give the vote to all—Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands—today have more equal disposable incomes than countries with a shorter experience of this kind of political equality. In many cases, reduced inequality in disposable income was the result of government programmes that benefited poorer voters (women and workers, for example) who had previously been excluded from voting.

This scatter plot shows the relationship between years of uninterrupted democracy and inequality in disposable income in 2015. The horizontal axis displays years of democracy from 25 to 125. The vertical axis displays inequality in disposable income, measured by the Gini coefficient, ranging from 0.2 to 0.7. The chart shows a negative relationship: countries with longer democratic histories tend to have lower income inequality. Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa have fewer than 50 years of democracy and Gini coefficients above 0.6. The United States has about 50 years of democracy with a Gini coefficient near 0.47. European countries with longer democratic histories, such as Sweden, Denmark, and UK, have Gini coefficients between 0.2 and 0.3.
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https://core-book-server.vercel.app/macroeconomics/10-government-as-economic-actor-06-democracy-makes-a-difference.html#figure-10-10

Figure 10.10 The duration of democracy and inequality in disposable income (2015).

Note: The correlation coefficient is −0.658.
Michael Coppedge et al. 2025. ‘V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v15’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. World Inequality Database. 2025.

Exercise 10.7 Work times and inequality in less democratic democracies

Consider a less strict definition of democracy, where a country is classified as ‘democratic’ even if women and some ethnic minorities are excluded from voting.

  1. Using the same data as Figures 10.9 and 10.10 (‘Dataset v15’, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project), re-plot both figures using this alternative definition of democracy, over the same period as in Figure 10.6 (1890–2025). The data on working hours and inequality are shown below.
Country Average hours worked (2019) Disposable income Gini (2023)
Australia 1,727 0.341
Austria 1,611 0.304
Belgium 1,586 0.283
Brazil 1,708 0.638
Canada 1,689 0.346
Denmark 1,381 0.215
Finland 1,591 0.276
France 1,505 0.268
Germany 1,386 0.318
India 2,123 0.611
Italy 1,718 0.356
Japan 1,691 0.381
Mexico 2,137 0.683
Netherlands 1,440 0.260
Norway 1,384 0.296
Poland 2,023 0.371
South Africa 2,191 0.611
South Korea 1,980 0.375
Sweden 1,605 0.242
Switzerland 1,557 0.250
United Kingdom 1,668 0.271
United States 1,765 0.467
  1. Using your data charts and appropriate calculations, explain how the statistical relationship between democracy and the following variables changes under the alternative definition of democracy:
    1. work time
    2. inequality
  1. Friedrich A. Hayek. 1994. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. A condensed version is also available

  2. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. ‘The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues’, Policy Research working paper WPS 5430, World Bank Group. 

  3. Freedom House. 2016. ‘Freedom in the World 2016. Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure’. Washington, DC. 

  4. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. 1993. ‘Political regimes and economic growth’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3) pp. 51–69.